We consider why imperfect deceptive mimics can persist when it appears to be in the predator's interest to discriminate finely between mimics and their models. One theory is that a receiver will accept being duped if the model and mimic overlap in appearance and the relative costs of attacking the model are high. However, a more fundamental explanation for the difficulty of discrimination is not based on perceptual uncertainty, but simply based on a lack of information. In particular, predators in the process of learning may cease sampling imperfect mimics entirely because the immediate payoff and future value of information is low, allowing such mimics to persist. This outcome will be particularly likely when the model is relatively costly to attack and/or the discriminative rules the predator has to learn are complex. Information limitations neatly explain why predators tend to adopt discriminative rules based on single traits (such as stripe colour), rather than on combinations of traits (such as stripe order). They also explain why predators utilize certain salient discriminative traits while ignoring equally informative ones (a phenomenon known as overshadowing), and why imperfect mimics may be more common in phenotypically diverse prey communities.
Introduction
In no affairs of mere prejudice, pro or con, do we deduce inferences with entire certainty, even from the most simple data.
Edgar Alan Poe [1, p. 16] .
One might think that there should always be strong selection pressure on a deceptive mimic to resemble its model as closely as possible. Indeed, there are some cases of palatable (Batesian) mimics that resemble their unprofitable models in a range of sensory modalities. For example, the parasitoid wasp Gelis agilis (Ichneumonidae) closely resembles the sympatric black garden ant (Lasius niger) in body size, morphology and movement, and even emits an ant alarm pheromone when approached by potential spider predators [2] . Yet mimicry does not always involve the convergence of such a full range of traits and there are many cases in nature in which potential mimics do not appear to resemble their models particularly well. For instance, many species of hoverfly are regarded as harmless (Batesian) mimics of stinging bees and wasps. Some hoverfly species resemble their models extremely closely, and even behave like their models when approached [3] . However, to the human eye at least, many other species do not resemble their putative models particularly well [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . Likewise, many species of harmless neotropical snakes bear only a coarse resemblance to the venomous coral snakes they are believed to mimic [9] .
Kikuchi & Pfennig [10] recently classified 11 separate (but not mutually exclusive) explanations for imperfect deceptive mimicry (table 1). As we proceed with our review, we briefly discuss some of the above hypotheses ( §2). Note, however, that we do not aim to simply update Kikuchi & Pfennig's excellent survey. Instead, we wish to advocate an additional, information-centred, explanation for the evolution and maintenance of imperfect mimicry that has been alluded to in a variety of contexts in the literature (e.g. [7,11 -14] ) but not systematically considered (see §3). As our opening quotation illustrates, despite the fact that predators are regularly faced with the decision to attack or reject potential mimics, the consequences of attacking such prey items are rarely if ever entirely certain to the decision maker. Even when mimics and models can be readily discriminated based on their appearance, the receiver has to first learn what traits to pay attention to ( §3a). We argue that when learning to recognize associations, predators will initially seek to adopt simple rules for discriminating mimics from models (such as avoid yellow prey), just as simple hypotheses are favoured over more complex ones in statistical model selection ( §3b). Whether predators move on to adopting more complex discriminative rules (such as avoid yellow prey, but only when paired with long antennae) depends on whether predators have the opportunity and motivation to sample more such prey to evaluate the plausibility of these more datademanding world views [11] . As such, our explanation for imperfect mimicry may be thought of as a constraintnot a genetic, or developmental constraint in the mimic as Kikuchi & Pfennig [10] discuss-but simply a consequence of information limitations of the predator when it forages optimally. In turn, these information limitations can lead to relaxed selection in which the imperfect mimic phenotype fares just as well as the perfect mimic.
Note that we are not arguing that predators are incapable of learning to recognize and employ discriminative cuesindeed, given the right incentive and sufficient opportunity, it is likely that predators can successfully solve even the most complex of discriminatory tasks, which will in turn select for very close mimicry ( §4). However, in many cases predators will need to learn from their mistakes, and attacking an unprofitable prey item can sometimes simply be too costly to justify further exploration. Identifying appropriate discriminative rules will be particularly challenging when the phenotypic diversity of profitable and unprofitable prey phenotypes is high [12] (see §3c), in which case, predators may do better by exploiting their basic knowledge, rather than investing more in fine-scale exploration [15] . This will leave the predator employing relatively crude rules of thumb to discriminate mimics and models which can allow imperfect mimics to slip through the cracks.
Note also that we are not assuming that predators have no innate capacity to avoid certain prey types. Indeed it has long been recognized, for example, that naive avian predators will tend to avoid coral snake patterns [16, 17] and this is precisely what one would expect when specific prey types are particularly costly to attack. Just as statisticians can tip the odds of one particular model of the world being chosen by selecting initial hypothesis distributions (Bayesian Table 1 . The 11 specific hypotheses tabulated in Kikuchi & Pfennig's [10] detailed review, along with a brief description of each hypothesis, and a simple classification of the nature of selection. See their tables 1 and 2 for further details. Although Kikuchi & Pfennig briefly discuss learning in their section 'Unexplained Phenomena', here we have advocated an additional explanation for imperfect mimicry based on the receiver's need to make decisions while learning how to differentiate mimics from models. priors), it seems likely that the prior beliefs of predators (such as an innate bias against prey with certain colours) are also subject to selection. However, while we would only rarely, if ever, expect uninformative (unbiased) priors, it is hard to envisage specific innate avoidances evolving for a wide range of different prey types that are only moderately unprofitable. The fact remains that learning is a widespread feature of the vast majority of experiments dealing with mimicry (e.g. [13,18 -20] ), and most biases can be overcome if there is sufficient opportunity and incentive to learn. Finally, although the idea that mimics remain imperfect because predators have not adopted the appropriate discriminative rules may seem somewhat obvious in hindsight, it is worth bearing in mind that theories of deceptive mimicry (in contrast to theories of Mü llerian mimicry among unpalatable species [12] ) have tended to assume that learning is complete. As we show, this simple 'information limitation' hypothesis not only explains the evolution and maintenance of imperfect mimicry, but also allows us to predict the traits under selection in would-be mimics and conversely, the traits that are likely to be overlooked by predators.
Some established explanations for imperfect mimicry
Here, we review some of the established explanations for imperfect mimicry, broadly classified according to the nature of selection (relaxed or stabilizing). Our short review is not intended to be exhaustive. Instead, we have highlighted contemporary explanations based on receiver perception. In §2a-c below, we contrast these perception-based explanations with theories based on information limitations.
(a) It is a good mimic, but we do not recognize it as such Swap 'perfection of mimicry' for 'beauty' in Margaret Hungerford's oft-quoted idiom ('Beauty is in the eye of the beholder' [21, p. 315]) and we have what we could consider the default hypothesis for imperfect mimicry-namely that mimics that appear imperfect to humans may actually appear as good mimics to their intended receivers. While it has long been appreciated that humans and non-humans can differ greatly in their perception (both in terms of sensory ability and the way they interpret this sensory information), the hypothesis was first invoked in the context of mimicry to explain apparent inconsistencies between human and pigeon evaluations of mimetic fidelity in hoverflies [4] . Specifically, pigeons tended to respond to the hoverflies Syrphus ribesii and Episyrphus balteatus as high fidelity mimics of wasps, yet Dittrich et al. [4] did not consider these species to be successful mimics from a human perspective. Cuthill & Bennett [22] proposed a simple and entirely plausible explanation for this discrepancy-slides are tailored to human colour perception rather than that of birds, and this may have affected the discriminability of the hoverflies that were presented. More generally, researchers frequently present potential mimics in a form (often dead and pinned) that does not reflect the way its intended receivers actually experience them. As such, measures of mimetic perfection should consider as far as possible the sensory ecology of the intended receiver(s), the behaviour of the prey in question and the conditions under which they are encountered in the field. Ironically, Dittrich et al. [4] had not quantified the mimetic fidelity of the hoverflies to humans and relied on their own impressions, possibly from seeing these species in the field. A subsequent quantification of mimetic fidelity based on the same images that had been presented to pigeons, suggested that Syrphus ribesii was not an outlier at all ( [6] , electronic supplementary material, figure S2 ; E. balteatus was not evaluated), in that it was considered a good mimic by humans, just as pigeons had rated it. So, while Cuthill & Bennett [22] made a valuable (and no doubt correct!) point that we should consider the perception of the intended receiver, their hypothesis is not needed to explain the specific discrepancy reported in hoverflies-arguably in this instance there was no case to answer.
The 'eye of the beholder' hypothesis makes it clear that we should consider the sensory system of the receiver, but we should also consider the possibility that we have simply identified the wrong model. So, like the Hans Christian Anderson 'Ugly Duckling' tale, what we think is an imperfect mimic (a duck) could be much more perfect than we had assumed (a swan)! For model-mimic systems with relatively low species diversity in any given area such as snakes, this appears unlikely. However, there are over 6000 recognized species of hoverfly and an order of magnitude more wasp and bee species that might serve as potential models. One possible example of an ugly duckling is the hoverfly Scaeva pyrastri, although we have yet to identify a more plausible model. Not only is this species (in our view) rather dissimilar in visible light to the Vespulid it is purported to resemble [23] , but it also has ultraviolet (UV) reflective colour which is absent in its model ( figure 1 ). This means that it is likely that the two species would be even more distinguishable to a predator with UV vision (including birds, insects and spiders).
(b) Relaxed selection through perceptual limitations
In his classic monograph on mimicry, Henry Walter Bates [24, p. 512] noted that: 'In many cases of mimetic resemblance, the mimicry is not so exact as in the Leptalides . . . It would show that the persecutor is not keen or rigid in its selection; a moderate degree of resemblance suffices to deceive it, and therefore the process halts at that point. ' In arguing that the selective process comes to a halt, it is clear that Bates was invoking a 'relaxed selection' argument for imperfect mimicry, with the imperfect mimic enjoying all the advantages of a more perfect mimic. However, it is helpful to clarify the meaning of 'suffices to deceive it'. In particular, the relaxed selection hypothesis does not rest on the assumption that the differences between mimics and models are unnoticed.
In fact, it has long been known that humans are capable of probabilistically detecting even the smallest of differences (such as whether a weight is lighter or heavier than a 100 g standard [25] ). Instead, we should recognize that it is not what the receiver believes, but how it acts that shapes selection on the mimic's phenotype.
Why would a predator ever act against its beliefs? If predators maximize their return from any given encounter then they should attack a prey item not when p . 0.5, but when the expected benefits outweigh the expected costs, namely
, where p is the estimated rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 372: 20160340 likelihood that the prey item is a mimic, and r ¼ c/b, where b is the mean benefit of attacking a mimic and c is the mean cost of attacking a model. Thus, when the cost of getting it wrong is 19 times that of the benefit of getting it right (compare for instance the significant cost of attacking a lethal coral snake with the benefit of attacking a palatable kingsnake), then even mimics that are only very vaguely model-like ( probability of being a mimic %0.95) should be avoided and there would be no selection for further mimicry.
Framed in this simple way, one might ask why receivers could not be completely certain in their assessments (i.e. p ¼ 0 or 1) if there was a reliable discriminative cue they could use. Mimics and models vary continuously in appearance so discrimination is not always clear-cut, but even if it was then the way they are perceived can also introduce additional uncertainty. For example, receivers may view mimics and models at unusual angles, at a distance [26] or with insufficient or deceptive illumination [27] . Speed-accuracy trade-offs may actively promote only a cursory inspection of objects that are encountered [8] .
Signal detection theory (SDT) provides perhaps the simplest framework for identifying optimal discriminative decisions under perceptual uncertainty [28 -30] including speed -accuracy trade-offs [31] . The standard SDT approach assumes that learning is complete and that the uncertainty derives from a combination of overlapping appearances and perception. Moreover, as no information is gained, the approach assumes that the decision to attack or reject a prey produces only immediate pay-offs to the predator with no future consequences. In balancing the benefits of correct decisions against the costs of incorrect ones, SDT makes the intuitive prediction that imperfect mimicry is most likely to be maintained when: (i) the model is extremely numerous and/or (ii) highly noxious, (iii) the mimic is not particularly beneficial and/or (iv) there are plenty of alternative prey. Kikuchi & Pfennig [10] reviewed a number of studies that evaluated the relationship between the perfection of mimicry and the above variables, and found that the results often matched the SDT predictions reasonably well (but see [6] with respect to the abundance of the mimic and [32] with respect to costs). For example, the fidelity of scarlet kingsnakes to their coral snake models tends to increase as the coral snake becomes rarer [33] . Likewise, the mimetic fidelity of hoverfly species tends to increase with body size [6] , a result readily understood if one assumes that larger mimics are more profitable to predators and/or more visible, and so intrinsically more likely to be attacked. However, the predictions of these basic SDT models cannot be considered unique, so the results do not in themselves demonstrate unequivocal evidence that the imperfect mimicry has arisen as a consequence of relaxed selection through perceptual limitations.
(c) Adaptive peaks through perceptual limitations and trade-offs
There are likely to be many cases in which increased mimetic perfection comes at a cost. These costs of increasing mimetic perfection could be incurred for a variety of reasons, such as a reduced ability to thermoregulate, a loss of function due to the modification of a body part, an increase in conspicuousness, or a decreased similarity to an alternative model. Other trade-offs, such as the mimic being harassed by a conspecific model in the belief that that it is a suitable mate, also fall into this general category. In each of these cases, a compromise phenotype may be actively selected for, with the imperfect mimic having a higher fitness than a more perfect mimic (see below). In perhaps the most detailed analysis of the types of mimetic solutions that evolve under constraints, Holen & Johnstone [34] employed an SDT model to show that when Batesian mimics have to pay a frequency-independent fitness (a) (b) Figure 1 . An ugly duckling? The hoverfly Scaevi pyrastri (a) and its wasp putative (human proposed) model Bembix rostrata (b) photographed in visible (left) and ultraviolet (UV) light (right). Not only do the two species differ strongly in size, body shape and pattern but S. pyrastri's yellow abdominal markings reflect UV light, while the yellow abdominal markings of B. rostrata are UV absorbing and so appear dark in a UV photograph. Photos were taken using a Nikon D70 camera with an El Nikkor 80 mm lens and an MTD70 EYE colour arc 70 W bulb for a light source. A Baader U UV filter was used for the UV photos.
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 372: 20160340 cost that increases with mimetic fidelity then they should either evolve inaccurate mimicry or a good mimic-bad mimic polymorphism when the mimics were relatively common (or the models were weakly defended). As such, Holen & Johnstone's [34] model predictions are completely counter to those made by standard SDT models. This difference arises because when mimics are relatively common, predators are very likely to attack models and mimics whatever their appearance-therefore, rather than pay the high costs of maintaining close mimicry, the mimics effectively 'give up' and adopt a cheap and inaccurate form that may occasionally fool a predator.
A related explanation for imperfect mimicry, proposed by Edmunds [5] is that it may arise as a consequence of frequency-dependent selection to resemble more than one model species simultaneously (the 'multi-model' hypothesis). Sherratt [30] adapted standard SDT models to show that if predators cannot completely discriminate among two or more models, then there will be a range of intermediate mimetic phenotypes which will be attacked by predators with equally low frequency. Within this phenotypic range, the extent of mimetic fidelity is selectively neutral. By contrast, accurate mimicry of one or the other model tends to be favoured when the models are readily distinguishable. Nevertheless, jack-of-all-trades phenotypes are still possible when the models are discriminable, so as long as the models are separated in space or time, and the mimic overlaps with both. The intermediate mimics in these cases should more closely resemble the model with which they coincide in space or time for longer. Somewhat surprisingly, however, all else being equal, they should resemble the less noxious and less numerous model. This latter prediction arises because even a vague resemblance to a highly noxious or common model may be sufficient to provide a high level of protection. Intriguingly, Darst & Cummings [35] describe two Ecuadorian poison frogs Epipedobates bilinguis and Epipedobates parvulus that serve as models for the phylogenetically distant Batesian mimic Allobates zaparo. Allobates zaparo is geographically dimorphic, matching each model's warning signals where only a given model occurs. However, in areas where the two models cooccur, then the mimic has evolved to resemble only the less toxic and less abundant E. bilinguis.
Paralleling the multi-model hypothesis is the multipredator hypothesis, which posits that while perfect mimicry may give some respite from generalist predators, it makes the mimic more vulnerable to specialist predators that target the model [36] . Pekár et al. [36] presented a simple SDT model to support this intriguing argument, and illustrated their case by showing that spiders that imperfectly mimicked ants gained more protection from spider-eating predators than non-mimetic spiders. By contrast, the authors argue that inaccurate ant mimicry may have been favoured in the presence of ant-feeding specialists so they are not mistaken as prey. So it is possible that a wide community of predators puts would-be mimics somewhere between a rock and a hard place, with an intermediate phenotype being the best of a bad deal.
The role of information
Here, we explain and justify our additional 'information limitation' hypothesis in more detail. First, we contrast explanations based on information limitations with explanations based on perceptual limitations. We then argue why predators tend to adopt simple rather than complex discriminative rules when discriminating between mimics and models, and why imperfect mimics might be more common in diverse communities. Finally, we show how attention to some discriminative traits may make other traits less reliable, and explain why some salient traits may effectively 'overshadow' others.
(a) Relaxed selection on mimicry through information limitations
Perceptual limitation arguments are based on the belief that predators rapidly become omniscient, but cannot confidently distinguish between a mimic and a model because the prey types overlap so closely in appearance (or the predator's observation of the prey is so fleeting). By contrast, the information limitation hypothesis recognizes that predators are not omniscient: while predators may be capable of perceiving even minor differences between mimics and models, they have to first identify appropriate discriminative traits. Like selecting which variables to include in a statistical model containing multiple potential terms, a predator must choose to pay attention to traits that seem to have the strongest predictive power in identifying profitable prey. Having identified a crude yet profitable rule of thumb, it may not be worth the receiver's while to invest in further information gathering for finer-scale discrimination. Indeed, in some cases the diversity of phenotypes may be so overwhelming that the receiver will never have sufficient data to learn all possible trait associations. Exploration -exploitation models [37] (otherwise known as 'bandit' models) capture the trade-off between investing in more information to understand a system (e.g. trying a new type of beer) or exploiting current information (selecting the tastiest brand from those you have already sampled). Exploration -exploitation models are particularly well suited to identifying the optimal set of decision criteria given information limitations, because they assume that learning is ongoing, that the uncertainty derives from a lack of complete knowledge, and that the decision to attack or reject a prey not only brings immediate pay-offs but can also change a predator's beliefs. One might think that gaining more information about an unfamiliar prey type would always be beneficial in the long run, but if the prey type was largely unprofitable to attack, then the predator would reach a point when exploiting its existing knowledge (in this case, avoiding the prey type altogether) would yield higher pay-off than gaining more information about the prey type [15] . Indeed, if the prey type was sufficiently rare (or costly to attack if unprofitable), then (depending on prior beliefs) such prey should be rejected at the outset because the future value of information is low. While optimal, avoiding prey on the basis of a partial understanding can inevitably lead to mistakes, especially because there is often little or no further sampling to provide additional information for a more informed decision. Indeed, a recent study invoked exploration -exploitation models to show just how superstitions can arise and be maintained from optimal use of incomplete information [38] . Likewise Kikuchi & Sherratt [11] recently showed that it would sometimes pay predators to lump unfamiliar prey that had common traits together-even if they could be phenotypically rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 372: 20160340 distinguished-if learning more about them separately was potentially expensive.
(b) Evidence that predators employ simple rather than complex discriminative rules
As some pollsters have learned the hard way, the aim of developing a conceptual model is not to explain all the nuances of an existing dataset, but to make future predictions. So, the best predictive model is one that captures the signal (a symphony, say) without seeking to explain the noise (audience coughs and shuffles). The primary technique to avoid such 'over-fitting' involves preferring simple models over more complex models, all else being equal. We suggest that a preference for parsimonious models may be particularly important for receivers when models are relatively unprofitable to sample, because an over-fitted model is not only a poorer predictor, but also more costly to parametrize [18, 19] . There has recently been a surge of interest in understanding how objects are categorized and what traits are attended to when predators make their discriminative decisions [39 -41] . Bain et al. [42] , for example, analysed the same training and test images of non-mimetic flies, wasps and hoverflies that had been presented to pigeons in Dittrich et al.'s [4] experiment using a feed-forward neural network classifier. They were able to closely fit the pigeon response data only if they assumed that pigeons place weight on some discriminative features (such as antennae length) but effectively overlook others (such as wing transparency). Likewise, Kikuchi & Pfennig [43] conducted field experiments involving clay snake models and found that predators are aversive to ringed mimics with the right proportions of red and black, but that the order of the coloured rings was effectively immaterial.
Why do predators of snakes overlook ring order but not colour [43] ? Conditional rules ('red and black-poison lack; red and yellow-kills a fellow') are effectively interactions. We suspect that it is highly likely that a predator with sufficient training would eventually learn to recognize this interaction, so we do not believe that they have a cognitive or perceptual blind spot. Instead, when the potential prey community is diverse (as in the case of hoverflies and their hymenopteran models) and/or contains some potentially lethal types (as in the case of snakes), then sufficient data may be hard to accumulate or too unprofitable to warrant obtaining. When faced with limited data (or limited incentive to gain new data), parsimonious models should be favoured over complex ones [11] , with receivers only prepared to assume interactions if there is clear evidence that they exist.
In a recent experiment, when presenting human subjects with computer generated mimics and models that varied continuously in their colour ( proportion of yellow and blue pixels) and/or size, Kikuchi et al. [19] found that subjects could successfully use either trait to profitably distinguish prey types when it was the sole distinguishing characteristic: adopting a threshold for rejection as classical SDT would predict. However, when mimics and models differed in both size and colour (such that, for instance, subjects were expected to avoid attacking prey with a high proportion of yellow, but only when large), subjects did not follow the predictions of multidimensional SDT and instead placed more emphasis on only one or the other characteristic (typically colour over size). So, once again we see that even humans at least initially adopt discriminative rules based on relatively few predictors that lack interactions.
(c) Stronger selection for perfect mimicry in simple prey communities
A number of studies have investigated the evolution and maintenance of imperfect mimicry among unprofitable prey, i.e. Mü llerian mimics, with particular interest in comparing the nature of selection for mimicry in simple and complex prey communities. SDT ( §2b) models are poorly equipped to deal with Mü llerian mimicry among unprofitable prey species, because Mü llerian mimicry is driven by associative learning, and SDT models assume complete knowledge. However, exploration-exploitation models explicitly assume learning, and are therefore readily adapted to understand the evolution of a range of forms of mimicry [44, 45] .
Wilson et al. [7] provided the first comparative data on comodel similarity among pairs of Mü llerian mimics, showing that (once one controls for phylogeny) velvet ant mimetic fidelity increases with body size. Although the phenomenon has yet to be formally modelled, it seems plausible that predators would be more willing to sample large prey with which they were unfamiliar than small prey (as larger prey would represent a more substantial meal [46] ), and that this greater incentive to sample would generate stronger selection for close mimicry in large species. Intriguingly, the mimicry ring that each species of velvet ant belonged to also explained some variation in mimetic fidelity. This observation led the authors to suggest an explanation for imperfect mimicry based on information limitations, namely that relaxed selection was more likely to occur in diverse systems where predators interact with multiple prey species, because it would force receivers to generalize more widely.
There is indeed accumulating evidence that community complexity can influence the strength of selection for mimicry. For example, Beatty et al. [12] conducted experiments on humans foraging for artificial computer generated prey and concluded that imperfect mimetic forms are more likely to spread in complex communities compared with simple communities, because of the need for predators to adopt simple rules of thumb to deal with the high signal diversity. Likewise, in laboratory trials, Ihalainen et al. [47] found that only those great tits that had foraged for prey in communities of artificial prey with little signal diversity actively selected against inaccurate mimics.
Besides a preference for simple combinations of predictors, appropriate model selection involves the recognition that the decision to include one predictor affects the value of employing other predictors. At its most extreme, when two or more predictors explain precisely the same variability in response, then all the redundant collinear predictors should be omitted. We now consider these additional features in turn, from the perspective of decision-making by predators.
(d) Attention to some traits makes others less reliable
As something of an aside, let us begin by exploring a simple numerical example in which predators could choose to avoid attacking costly models on the basis of the presence of a diagnostic colour Cþ (e.g. red) or pattern Pþ (e.g. striped) (table 2). We will also assume for convenience that b ¼ c ¼ 1 (see  §2b) .
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This numerical approach is for demonstration only. An analytical derivation is beyond the scope of the current paper, but the approach is readily extended to deal with different costs and benefits as well as variation in the frequencies and collinearity of the diagnostic traits.
As both Cþ and Pþ traits are more likely to be found in models than mimics, one might anticipate that it would pay a predator to avoid attacking prey with these features. Thus, if the predator indiscriminately attacked all prey then it would gain zero. However, a predator that avoided all prey with colour Cþ would gain a pay-off of 450 [from attacking mimics] 2 50 [from attacking models] ¼ 400 were it to exploit all the available prey. Conversely, a predator which avoided all prey with pattern Pþ would gain a pay-off of 480 [from attacking mimics] 2 470 [from attacking models] ¼ 10. If the two discriminative rules give a net pay-off separately, then one might think that the pay-off to a predator that avoided both colour Cþ and pattern Pþ would be even higher. Of course, in the unlikely event that the traits were mutually exclusive (no prey with both Cþ and Pþ are present), the net pay-off to a predator that avoids both would be 430 -20 ¼ 410. A more appropriate starting point, however, is to assume that the traits are entirely independently distributed. If we assume these conditions, then on average (450/500) Â (480/500) Â 500 ¼ 432 mimics will have neither trait, while only (50/500) Â (470/ 500) ¼ 47 models will have neither trait. Therefore, any predator that avoided prey with either Cþ or Pþ would have a net pay-off of 432 -47 ¼ 385 after exploiting all the prey, which is lower than the pay-off were it to reject prey based on Cþ alone! Why is it that a predator that attended to one trait (Cþ) rather than two traits (either Cþ or Pþ) would have a higher pay-off despite the fact that both traits are disproportionately more frequent in models than their mimics? We can answer this question by calculating the marginal pay-offs. Consider a predator that began by avoiding Cþ prey on encounter, so that prey with both Cþ and Pþ, and prey with Cþ alone are avoided. We need to ask whether it would have paid the predator to also have avoided prey with Pþ alone (no Cþ). We can calculate the expected number of mimics with Pþ alone as 20 2 (20/500) Â (50/500) Â 500 ¼ 18 while the number of models with Pþ alone would be 30 2 (30/500) Â (450/ 500) Â 500 ¼ 3. So, if the predator avoids any prey with Cþ, then the remaining prey with the pattern Pþ that lacked colour Cþ are more likely to be mimics than models, and should be attacked rather than avoided! So, somewhat counterintuitively, predators should not always use all of the discriminative traits that might initially be available to them. As we have seen, when any given discriminative trait is employed, then it can alter the strength and nature of association that other traits have with models to such an extent that it will sometimes pay the predator to use one discriminative trait rather than two.
In an interesting paper that follows nicely from the above example, Rubi & Stephens [48] experimentally explored the effect of jointly varying the reliability of a colour signal and a pattern signal in indicating profitability. To do this, the authors presented captive blue jays with artificial moth-like prey that were either light or dark, and patterned with thin or thick lines. Selecting a mimic provided food to the bird, while choosing a model yielded no food. The reliability of the colour trait, defined as q c ¼ P(ModeljCþ) (.0.5), was controlled by a computer program. As the signal was of two forms (binary) then P(ModeljCþ) ¼ P(MimicjC2). Likewise the reliability of a binary pattern signal was independently controlled and defined as q p ¼ P(ModeljPþ) ¼ P(MimicjP2).
It is easy to show that the optimal foraging strategy of predators under these conditions depends on the benefits and costs of attacking a mimic and model, respectively, and understandably the authors did not quantify this. However, when one trait (Cþ say) is considerably more reliable than another trait (Pþ) then, as illustrated above, there are many circumstances when predators should use this more reliable trait alone, and not both traits, when rejecting prey. This is precisely what the authors found, with blue jays following the more reliable trait and ignoring the less reliable trait, although there was a bias for using colour when the two traits were equally reliable. However, it should be noted that there are several important caveats to the 'follow the most reliable' rule. Most importantly, in Rubi & Stephen's [48] experiment, prey signals were binary in that evidence for the model was evidence against the mimic and vice versa. More generally, however, when there are multiple possible signals, then a rare signal (such as the colour blue) may be of little value to a predator even if it is extremely reliable (P(Modeljblue) ¼ 1), because so few models (or mimics) have it. So reliability is important, but it is not always the best criterion for discriminating among prey types, or the one that predators will learn first.
(e) Salient signals may overshadow less salient signals
How should receivers respond when two or more traits have the same reliability and frequency? The phenomenon of reacting (for example, a dog sitting down) more strongly to one salient conditioned stimulus (waving a treat) than another, less salient, stimulus (saying 'sit'), when both have been presented together, is known as 'overshadowing' [49] . Extending the model-fitting analogy, we argue that including highly collinear traits together in any given discriminative rule is inappropriate because at least one is redundant-they effectively explain one another's variability. As such, it is possible that overshadowing is largely adaptive.
One of the most ambitious studies to date on overshadowing with respect to mimicry was conducted by Kazemi et al. [13] , who trained wild-caught blue tits, Cyanistes caeruleus, to discriminate between rewarding prey ( pictures of symbols placed over wells containing pieces of mealworm) and nonrewarding prey (symbols over empty wells). The symbols Table 2 . A simple numerical example in which mimics and models can be probabilistically distinguished on the basis of the presence/absence of a specific colour (Cþ) and/or pattern (Pþ) trait. Each of these traits is disproportionately more likely to occur in the model than the mimic. over rewarding and non-rewarding wells differed from one another in their colour, pattern and shape, and the blue tits learned to feed almost exclusively on the rewarding wells over four separate trials. Naturally, this high level of discrimination could have been achieved by using any given combination of colour, pattern and/or shape in the symbols. To evaluate which traits were being used in the discrimination process, the authors then presented the same birds with an identical collection of rewarding prey, along with non-rewarding (i.e. Mü llerian) mimics that only had one trait (colour, pattern or shape) in common with the earlier models that the birds had learned to avoid (the former models were also used as a control). The results of this test showed that rather than learning to avoid only those prey with all three attributes, the birds generalized their avoidance to non-rewarding prey that had colour in common with the former models, to such an extent that they were not attacked any more frequently than the perfect controls. Collectively, the above work suggests that high-salience discriminatory traits (in this case colour) can overshadow other informative traits, allowing incipient mimics a significant survival advantage even if they share only one trait with the model. Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing that the imperfect mimics in these experiments were non-rewarding, and it is unclear whether imperfect Batesian (rewarding) mimics would enjoy such survival advantages in this system over the longer term (see §4). Sherratt et al. [19] extended their design to include two-trait mimics and no-trait novel prey, this time using humans as predators, with similar results. However, the fact that novel prey were frequently avoided in these experiments indicates that predators do not simply learn to associate bad outcomes with certain traits, but that they also learn to associate good outcomes with certain traits. The presence of alternative prey has long been recognized as an important factor influencing model-mimic dynamics [50] , so the preference of predators for 'safer' foods in an uncertain world may help imperfect Batesian mimics to persist in the longer term.
As with the above studies, Rubi & Stephens [48] found that colour trumped pattern when both were equally reliable indicators of profitability. Why is colour more important than other traits such as pattern or shape in prey discrimination? All else being equal, one might expect that priority would be given to reacting to traits that will allow the receiver to identify the object as quickly and unambiguously as possible. Colour constancy, or the ability to identify the same hue under different lighting conditions, is widespread among animals (including humans), despite differences in the evolution of their visual systems [51] . By contrast, pattern and size perception can vary with distance [52] , and perception of shape is a complex process that can be affected by many factors [51] . Thus, colour similarity may be favoured over other informative traits simply because it is one of the most obvious and reliably perceived traits to which to pay attention.
Why are some deceptive mimics perfect?
There are now such a plethora of explanations for imperfect mimicry, one might wonder why perfect mimicry arises at all. Above we have argued that imperfect mimicry will be maintained when receivers do not have sufficient opportunity, or motivation, to collect sufficient data to form a particularly sophisticated view of the world. Naturally, when over-simplified discriminative rules are indefinitely favoured, then imperfect mimicry can be maintained. However, what is the outcome if predators are exposed repeatedly to the mimics? Skelhorn et al. [20] performed just this sort of experiment when they presented naive domestic chicks with pastry caterpillars over 8 days. The caterpillars were either with or without eyes, and with or without a swollen head, with the presence of both traits conferring the closest resemblance to a snake model. The chicks rapidly attacked the caterpillars that had neither mimetic trait, but initially exhibited similar levels of wariness towards mimics with just one or both deceptive traits. Over repeated exposures however, chicks discovered that the single-trait mimics were profitable more quickly than they discovered the double-trait mimics were profitable. So, predators' initial reactions to novel or deceptive prey will not necessarily be the same as their long-term reactions. Indeed, in systems where the incentive or opportunity to gain more data is high, then one can anticipate strong selection for perfect mimicry.
Conclusion
Like many well-known puzzles in evolutionary biology ranging from cooperation to sexual reproduction, imperfect mimicry is rapidly becoming a problem with many potential solutions. Here, we have added to the problem by describing evidence for another explanation for the phenomenon, based on information limitations rather than perceptual ones. Naturally, if a predator knew what traits to look for, then in many cases discrimination would become easy. However, we propose that imperfect mimicry arises because predators frequently have to first learn how discriminate between mimics and models. Gaining information comes at a cost, so even if a predator employs its available information in the most optimal way, then it will often end up using overly simplified rules of thumb to sort profitable from unprofitable prey, allowing crude imitations to persist.
The various hypotheses that have been proposed to explain imperfect mimicry are not mutually exclusive and we are not in a position to evaluate their relative importance. However, the fact that learning is so widespread in experiments dealing with Batesian mimicry, and is considered the key driver of Mü llerian mimicry, strongly suggests that information limitations may play an important role in shaping the phenotypes of mimics.
